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How	cultural	theory	can	help	us	to	better	design	and
implement	social	impact	bonds
Social	impact	bonds	–	arrangements	that	bring	together	the	public,	private	and	voluntary	sectors	in
order	to	address	complex	social	issues	–	are	often	characterised	by	tensions.	Ruth	Dixon	explains
how	cultural	theory	can	be	used	to	explain	the	dynamics	between	the	various	partners	in	order	to
improve	this	useful	policy	tool.
During	a	recent	conference	on	outcomes-based	commissioning	and	social	impact	bonds,	I	noticed
some	positive	examples,	as	well	as	some	tensions	that	can	arise	in	such	arrangements.	Tensions,	for	example,
between:
rigorous	performance	management	vs	a	collaborative,	cooperative	approach;
a	user-focused,	flexible	attitude	vs	working	to	pre-determined	outcomes	targets;
a	short-term	focus	on	cashable	savings	vs	an	innovative,	preventive	outlook.
Alec	Fraser	and	colleagues	from	the	Policy	Innovation	Research	Unit	have	already	pointed	out	the	potential	tensions
arising	from	competing	public	and	private	organisational	values.	Here	I	explore	how	fundamental	differences	of
outlook	between	the	different	stakeholders	can	go	some	way	towards	explaining	such	tensions.
What	is	cultural	theory	and	why	is	it	relevant?
In	the	1970s	and	’80s,	the	anthropologist	Mary	Douglas	carried	out	a	comprehensive	characterisation	of	‘worldviews’,
known	as	the	Cultural	Theory	of	Risk.	She	identified	four	distinct	worldviews	based	on	the	dimensions	of	‘group’	and
‘grid.’	‘Group’	describes	the	cohesiveness	of	a	society	or	organisation;	‘high-group’	is	tightly	knit	and	cooperative,
while	‘low-group’	is	less	trusting	and	more	individualistic.	‘Grid’	describes	the	extent	to	which	the	organisation	is
based	on	rules:	‘high-grid’	is	based	on	rigid	rules	while	‘low-grid’	has	norms	or	conventions	that	are	more	flexible	and
negotiable.	The	combination	of	grid	and	group	dimensions	leads	to	the	four	distinct	types	shown	in	Table	1.
Douglas	argued	that	societal	groups	tend	to	polarise	into	one	of	these	four	types	rather	than	converging	on	the
middle	ground.	This	is	because	each	type	defines	itself	by	the	perceived	risk	of	adopting	other	worldviews.	These
ideas	were	extended	by	other	scholars	such	as	Thompson	and	co-authors	in	their	book	Cultural	Theory	that	was
published	in	1990,	and	others	have	applied	it	to	environmental	risk	and	public	participation.	Christopher	Hood	also
discusses	the	potential	benefits	and	pitfalls	experienced	by	public	organisations	that	embody	these	cultural	types	in
his	book	The	Art	of	the	State:	Culture,	rhetoric,	and	public	management.
Considering	different	stakeholders	
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So	how	might	cultural	theory	apply	to	the	stakeholders	involved	in	social	impact	bonds	(SIBs)?	Social	Finance	argue
that	SIBs	align	the	“interests	of	non-profit	service	providers,	private	investors,	and	governments”	to	address	complex
social	issues	and	improve	the	life	chances	of	disadvantaged	citizens.	But	what	if	the	partners	to	a	SIB	contract	do	not
share	a	world	view?	Can	their	interests	be	easily	aligned?	To	put	this	in	more	concrete	form,	we	can	consider	the
typical	worldviews	of	the	various	SIB	stakeholders.	The	following	discussion	is	certainly	an	oversimplification	but
serves	to	illustrate	the	potential	issues.
Credit:	Department	for	Digital,	Culture,	Media	&	Sport
The	commissioner	
Consider	first	the	commissioner,	normally	a	central	or	local	government	organisation.	Budgetary	pressures	and	rigid
procurement	rules,	often	combined	with	rapid	turnover	of	post-holders,	tend	to	make	such	organisations	more
comfortable	with	a	hierarchical,	rule-based	structure	and	uncomfortable	with	lots	of	flexibility	and	re-negotiation.
Such	preferences	are	not	easily	overturned	despite	the	rhetoric	of	cooperation	and	collaboration.	The	‘SIB	team’
within	the	organisation	may	be	convinced	of	the	advantages	of	collaboration	but	can	find	it	difficult	to	change	the
outlook	of	other	parts	of	the	organisation.
The	service	provider	
The	service-provider,	in	contrast,	is	typically	a	non-profit	organisation	from	the	voluntary,	charitable	or	social
enterprise	(VCSE)	sector.	SIBs	are	intended	to	enable	more	of	these	smaller	–	often	local	–organisations	to	provide
public	services	rather	than	the	traditional	large	outsourcing	companies.	However,	the	‘worldview’	of	VCSE
organisations	is	likely	to	be	more	egalitarian	and	less	rule-based	and	hierarchical	than	that	of	the	government
commissioner	(or	of	large	private	contractors).	Evaluations	often	highlight	the	tensions	caused	by	the	performance
management	regime	that	the	SIB	structure	imposes	on	service	providers.	Furthermore,	the	provider	may	be	more
inclined	to	tailor	their	service	to	the	client’s	perceived	needs	than	to	the	outcomes	pre-determined	by	the
commissioner.
The	investor	or	intermediary
What	about	the	investor	(and/or	the	investor-linked	intermediary)?	The	SIB	rationale	is	that	the	investor	pays	for
service	provision	and	is	reimbursed	by	the	commissioner	when	outcomes	are	achieved.	If	the	investor	represents	the
private	sector	(though	it	should	be	noted	that	this	is	not	always	the	case),	we	would	expect	their	world	view	to	be
essentially	individualistic	(low-grid,	low-group).	The	investor	is	meant	to	bring	‘market	discipline’	to	the	contract,
supporting	the	service	provider	to	achieve	payable	outcomes.	And,	like	the	service	provider,	the	investor	may	wish	to
renegotiate	the	outcomes	with	the	commissioner	if	they	are	found	to	be	unachievable	or	inappropriate.
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Thus,	we	find	in	the	contracting	parties	at	least	the	possibility	of	three	contrasting	worldviews	(hierarchical,
egalitarian,	and	individualistic).	Perhaps	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	process	of	setting	up	a	SIB	is	often	characterised
by	a	prolonged	negotiation	period	and	that	the	development	of	trust	between	contracting	parties	takes	a	great	deal	of
time	and	effort.
The	front	line	worker
So	far	I	have	not	mentioned	the	fourth	quadrant	of	the	table.	This	is	the	‘fatalistic’	(low-group,	high-grid)	world	view,
where	rules	are	fixed	but	trust	and	cooperation	are	low.	Occupants	of	this	quadrant	are	powerless	to	alter	the	rules
for	which	they	are	held	to	account,	thus	they	tend	to	view	the	world	as	arbitrary	and	unfair.	Here,	it	might	be	argued
that	we	could	find	clients	and	(in	some	cases)	front-line	workers	of	SIBs.	The	whole	success	of	the	SIB	depends	on
the	outcomes	such	as	jobs,	qualifications,	and	reductions	in	anti-social	behaviour	that	are	achieved	by	the	clients
through	their	own	efforts	and	those	of	the	front-line	staff,	yet	these	stakeholders	often	have	little	influence	at	the
design	stage.	The	target	outcomes	tend	to	be	set	by	the	government	commissioner	and	contract	negotiations
normally	take	place	at	a	high	managerial	level.	If	the	input	of	operational	staff	is	not	sought	until	a	later	stage,	they
may	be	faced	with	a	fait	accompli–	things	have	already	been	decided	–	and	expected	to	make	the	arrangement	work
anyway.	And	clients	who	do	not	value	the	same	outcomes	as	the	commissioner	are	less	likely	engage	with	the
programme.
Of	course,	the	previous	paragraph	paints	a	very	pessimistic	picture,	highlighting	the	dysfunctional	aspects	of	fatalism
that	could	arise.	Qualitative	SIB	evaluations	in	fact	often	report	positive	experiences	of	both	clients	and	staff	showing
that	fatalism	is	not	inevitable	or	even	usual.	For	example,	the	final	report	for	the	HMP	Peterborough	SIB	shows	that
a	personal	‘risk	and	needs	assessment’	was	undertaken	for	each	enrolled	prisoner	resulting	in	a	more	responsive,
flexible,	and	individualised	service.	Nonetheless,	other	SIB	evaluations	point	to	difficulties	encountered	by	front-line
staff	being	held	accountable	without	the	power	to	adjust	or	negotiate	the	rules	of	engagement	even	if	those	rules
were	found	to	be	inappropriate	or	irrelevant	in	practice.	Thus	stakeholders	who	might	wish	to	be	egalitarian	could	find
themselves	pushed	towards	fatalism	by	the	inflexibility	of	the	partnership	structure.
Can	cultural	theory	help	us	to	better	design	and	implement	SIBs?
So	how	does	the	cultural	theory	framework	help	us	to	understand	existing	SIBs	and	to	better	design	and	implement
new	ones?	In	my	view,	this	framework	highlights	the	fact	that	cooperation	is	difficult,	particularly	between
organisations	with	different	traditions	and	outlooks.	Organisational	culture	is	difficult	to	alter,	at	least	in	the	short	term,
and	the	interests	of	stakeholders	with	different	worldviews	are	difficult	to	align.
Nevertheless,	there	are	huge	potential	advantages	of	bringing	together	organisations	with	different	outlooks	both	in
order	to	benefit	from	the	insights	and	expertise	that	each	can	provide	and	to	overcome	the	inherent	disadvantages	of
each	cultural	type.	By	recognising	and	accommodating	these	culture	clashes,	SIB	partners	may	be	able	to	work
together	more	effectively	to	address	intractable	public	service	challenges.
_________
Note:	a	version	of	this	article	first	published	on	the	Blavatnik	School’s	GO	Lab	blog	and	is	reposted	here	with	thanks.
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